NGOs and Indian Politics Rob Jenkins
A nalysing the relationship between NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Indian politics is a fraught task. Considerable terminological confusion a icts the sizable literature on India's NGOs. ere is also a long history to be considered: India's 'modern' voluntary sector, broadly conceived, goes back to at least the late nineteenth century. Disagreements over its relationship to political activity were present from the start. Just to complicate ma ers, discussions of NGOs are o en subsumed within the larger discourse of 'civil society' .
Since the idea of civil society is so ubiquitous, it is as good a place as any to begin the discussion of the role of NGOs in Indian politics. What civil society is and is not, whether it is culture-bound, how it arises, whether it can be promoted, what purposes it serves, whether a transnational variety is emerging none of these questions have generated anything remotely resembling consensus. e conceptions of Locke, Marx, Gramsci, and others jostle for pre-eminence. Political theorists question the liberal assumptions o en smuggled into contemporary de nitions of civil society.
Development agencies debate the practical utility of the idea of civil society. Members of civil society themselves cannot agree on where its boundaries lie, and therefore, who is included within its ranks.
Amidst the conceptual ambiguity, Kaviraj has traced a common thread running through almost all the accounts of civil society: their de nitions are 'based on dichotomies or contrasts' . Civil society is variously 'de ned through its opposition to "natural society" or "state of nature" in early modern contract theory …; against the state in the entire liberal tradition, and contrasted to community (Gemeinscha ) in a theoretical tradition of modern sociology' . Civil society thus 'appears to be an idea strangely incapable of standing freely on its own' (Kaviraj 2001: 288) .
NGOs like civil society generally are frequently located conceptually within more than just one dichotomy. In the usage that predominates in India's contemporary political discourse, an NGO is not just a non-state actor; depending on who is doing the de ning, there are any number of things that NGOs are not. ey are not political parties; they are not social movements; they are not labour unions; they are not even, according to some critics, agents of popular struggle at all. Indeed, apart from its status as an entity distinct from the government, existing within a realm of associational freedom, the Indian NGO's de ning characteristic is its constitutional inability to engage in politics except, it would seem, as an unwi ing tool of larger forces (Ndegwa 1996) . Or so the NGOs' myriad detractors would have us believe.
is essay explores two paradoxical implications of this widespread, though of course not universal, characterization. e rst is that despite their ostensible location in the non-political domain of civil society, NGOs have over the past forty years ended up playing a central, if indirect, role in India's politics.
ey have increasingly served as a crucial reference point, a kind of photographic negative against which other actors party leaders, movement gures, union representatives have sought, by contrast, to de ne themselves and imagine their own distinctiveness.
is has invested NGOs and their actions with far more political signi cance than might otherwise have been the case.
e second paradox is that the more vigorously these other political actors have sought to di erentiate themselves from the NGO sector, the less tangible have become the boundaries separating them from their NGO colleagues. By articulating their critique of India's NGOs through a series of stark, valueladen dichotomies, their detractors have provided a powerful incentive for NGOs to reinvent themselves. e result has been experimental cross-breeds with other species of civic association, creating new organizational hybrids. is, combined with profound institutional change in the structure of the Indian political system, has over the past two decades led to a more direct role for NGOs in India's politics.
TERMINOLOGICAL CONFUSION
What is an NGO? is question has been answered in a variety of ways in India. Internationally recognized de nitions are o en a starting point, but rarely a nal destination. Most international institutions recognize that the term NGO encompasses a wide variety of organizational forms. A key World Bank operational document 1995's Working with NGOs de ned NGOs as 'private organizations that pursue activities to relieve su ering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services or undertake community development' (World Bank 1995: 7) . is is broadly consistent with popular usage. NGOs are generally associated with charitable activities that promote the public good rather than, as with business associations or labour unions, advancing private interests.
Most de nitions for NGOs include a list of the organizational forms they can take, based on the terms used by associations to describe themselves. ese include 'community-based organizations', 'grassroots organizations', 'self-help groups', 'credit societies', and so forth. ere is much disagreement as to whether each subcategory quali es as an NGO are credit societies about the public interest? or whether a group's self-description is su cient to determine its classi cation. Some groups that call themselves grassroots organizations may in fact have very li le demonstrable following among ordinary people, raising the question of whether it is feasible to set objective criteria for de ning any organization that describes itself with as vague a pre x as 'mass-based', 'grassroots', or 'people's' . E orts to stipulate meaningful criteria to distinguish NGOs from other forms of civil society, or to distinguish one type of NGO from another, quickly run into trouble. In one of the most systematic (and in many ways admirable) accounts of India's NGO sector, Sen distinguishes NGOs from Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and what he calls Grassroots Organizations (GROs), stating that CBOs and GROs are membership-based, whereas NGOs are not (Sen 1999) . He then quali es this statement in recognition of the fact that regulations governing various NGOs as legal entities (societies, charitable trusts, non-pro t corporations) o en require o cials of such organizations to be members.
Sen draws on the international literature (Farrington et al., 1993; Korten 1990 ) to arrive at a de nition exible enough to accommodate the Indian context:
In India, NGOs can be de ned as organizations that are generally formed by professionals or quasi professionals from the middle or lower middle class, either to serve or work with the poor, or to channel nancial support to community-based or grassroots organizations. (Sen 1999: 332) Community Based Organizations, on the other hand, are composed of 'the poor' or 'the low-income community' a valiant a empt at conveying the general usage in the development eld, but one that inevitably sidesteps uncomfortable questions, such as what middle-class neighbourhood associations should be called. Moreover, many NGOs contest the idea that they were 'formed by' middle-class people. In the end, despite di erentiating NGOs from CBOs and GROs, Sen cannot avoid, for practical reasons, including the la er two within 'the universe' of NGOs either.
Partly because de ning an NGO is so tricky, data on the size of the NGO sector is similarly variable. One longstanding NGO network, the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), estimated the number of NGOs in India in 2001 at 1.5 million. One PRIA survey found that almost three-quarters of NGOs have one or fewer paid sta , and that nearly 90 per cent of NGOs have fewer than ve members of sta . 1 Raina, however, cites a gure of 200,000 Indian NGOs . Statistics compiled by the Home Ministry indicate that in 2000-1 nearly 20,000 organizations were registered under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 1976, though only 13,800 submi ed their accounts to the government as required. e total foreign funds received by these groups increased by more than 25 per cent between 1998-9 and 2000-1, from Rs 34 billion to Rs 45 billion. 2 While it is di cult to arrive at a consistent and theoretically satisfying set of criteria that would allow us to impose precise boundaries around the NGO sector of civil society, a rough-and-ready practical de nition exists, and is in widespread use. In common parlance throughout India's 'activist' community (which I take to include all people working for social change, regardless of the types of organizations with which they are a liated, so long as they are not state employees), public-interest groups that are not 'people's movements' are regarded as NGOs.
e distinction is o en contested, not least by avowedly 'movement' groups eager to avoid the 'NGO' label, which confers an establishment status with which many activists do not wish to be associated. Using the term NGO to refer to a group that describes itself as a people's organization is usually a not-so-subtle form of denigration. e 'movement' descriptor is prized as a symbol of political legitimacy, not in the sense of representing widespread mainstream acceptance, but in terms of a group's commitment to a radical form of political engagement, the precise content of which inevitably varies from one context to the next. e NGO label connotes an apolitical (or worse, non-political, or even depoliticizing) form of social action.
e origins of what might thus be called 'movement populism' the idea that more formal organizational forms are alienated from ordinary people's concerns and perpetuate elite biases lay in the widespread discrediting of NGOs that has taken place in India since the early 1980s. However, before outlining the basis for these critiques of India's NGOs, we must return to the age of NGO innocence. Given the extent of their recent demonization, it is not surprising that NGOs once enjoyed a golden era, before their fall from grace.
NGOS AND NARRATIVES OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY
NGOs have gured prominently in many wellrehearsed narratives about the trajectory of India's democracy. ese frequently involve a fall-from-grace element. Sheth and Sethi's account of the 'historical context' of the 'NGO sector' nicely encapsulates the dominant themes: the conversion of voluntarism into primarily a favoured instrumentality for developmental intervention has changed what was once an organic part of civil society into merely a sector an appendage of the developmental apparatus of the state. Further, this process of instrumental appropriation has resulted in these agencies of self-activity losing both their autonomy and politicaltransformative edge. (Sheth and Sethi 1991) How India's progressive intelligentsia has viewed the country's NGOs particularly their potential contribution to an alternative form of politics has varied considerably over the past forty years. It is because there is such variety among NGOs, and considerable diversity even among the broadly Leleaning intelligentsia, that there are no unambiguous pa erns. But broadly speaking, during much of the 1970s, intellectuals invested great hope in the country's NGOs as a force for the reinvigoration of democracy.
e prevailing tendency at the time was not to distinguish too minutely between organizational forms or to split hairs over the descriptive terms applied to individual groups, both of which were later to become standard practice. Analysts seeking to understand the signi cance of these new 'social action groups' for Indian democracy quickly embraced the term devised to encompass such diversity: 'non-party political formations' (Kothari 1984) .
e emergence in the early 1970s of a tangible sense of optimism about the NGOs' potential to play a major role in democracy's reinvigoration coincided with other important political trends. e most notable was the creeping authoritarianism of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. She had abolished Congress's intra-party elections, following her triumphs against, rst, the Congress old guard that had sought to tame her, and second, the Pakistani army during the 1971 war that created an independent Bangladesh. e movement that opposed Mrs Gandhi's increasingly personalized form of rule, her anti-union policies, and her a acks on judicial independence among other things included within its ranks a large number of NGOs. Several of these traced their lineages back to Mahatma Gandhi, and adopted a Gandhian vocabulary and repertoire of tactics. Many people who would later form the mainstay of India's social activist community entered this porous eld in response to a major drought in eastern Indian in the mid-1960s, at which time they emerged as articulate spokespersons for an alternative form of political engagement, even as they organized and delivered vital relief services. e civic owering that ensued was celebrated as a democratic rebirth. It was also widely explained as a response to the failure of India's formal political process, still dominated by elite groups, to address the pressing concerns of poor and marginalized people.
e mushrooming of India's NGOs was seen as substituting for the failure of India's other democratic institutions particularly its parties to provide avenues of political engagement. 'Environmental action groups' such as the Dasholi Gram Swaraj Sangh, which kick-started the Chipko Andolan in the early 1970s, were supposed to help pick up some of the institutional slack. Rajni Kothari was among the earliest and most eloquent spokespersons for this view, but an entire generation of intellectuals and activists invested enormous hope in the capacity of non-party political formations to transform the nature of politics, and to extend democracy to constituencies that had not been active participants (Sethi 1984; Sheth 1984) . is was a theme that continued long a er the love a air with the voluntary sector zzled.
However, it was not just the 'weakness' of party organizations against which Sethi (1993) and other writers were reacting, but their 'strength' as well. For much of the post-Independence period, party-a liated civic groups have dominated the political space that should have served as the natural home for alternative politics. e front organizations connected to every political party women's wings, student federations, trade unions, farmers' associations usually lacked autonomy (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987) . As India's voluntary sector came of age in the early 1970s, it faced the task of transcending the partisan divisions that ran throughout civil society.
e high point of the NGOs' political role, the moment that appeared most strongly to redeem their promise, was the internal Emergency imposed by Mrs Gandhi from 1975-7. NGOs were a crucial part of the nationwide protest agitations that led her to declare the Emergency (Brass 1990) . During the Emergency itself, NGO leaders were imprisoned, along with more traditional (that is, partisan) political gures. e Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FC ) 1976, enacted at the height of Mrs Gandhi's paranoia about external subversion the 'foreign hand' allowed her government to deny access to foreign funding to NGOs considered likely to threaten 'the sovereignty and integrity of India, the public interest, freedom or fairness of election to any legislature, friendly relations with any foreign state, harmony between religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups, castes or communities' . is wide, though by now restated, remit continues to provide ample opportunity for government intimidation of NGOs, and of course scope for considerable rent-seeking. NGOs also contributed to the political mobilization that helped to bring the Emergency to an end, and many were outright supporters of, or even incorporated within, opposition parties that brought about Mrs Gandhi's defeat in the 1977 general election that followed.
As the rickety Janata coalition government assumed power in 1977, there was more than a hint of Gandhian schaden eude in the air: dispersed voluntary groups were cast as having rescued democracy from the havoc wrought by Nehru's legacy not just his daughter's personalistic rule, but the entire top-down, state-centric approach to social and economic change. It was during the Janata government that a range of rural development programmes and participatory techniques pioneered by NGOs were incorporated within state policy (Franda 1983) . Revisionists seek to discount the importance of NGOs in the events surrounding the Emergency, preferring to a ribute the key role to movements rather than to NGOs. is, however, is to impose an anachronistic distinction that possessed none of the connotations that arose subsequently.
By the time Indira Gandhi began her second stint in o ce in 1980, her approach to the voluntary sector had become considerably more complex. On the one hand, she associated this constituency with those who had brought about her political downfall. Her government appointed the infamous Kudal Commission, which investigated a large number of NGOs particularly Gandhian organizations and exerted a chilling e ect on many others. On the other hand, Mrs Gandhi had become severely disillusioned by the state's potential for e ecting social change (Kohli 1990 ). It was under Indira Gandhi that India's movement towards a liberalized economy began, though this trend would assume more concrete form under her son Rajiv, and especially under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao from 1991. 3 Mrs Gandhi, and Rajiv even more so, embraced the idea of an NGO-led 'third sector' as a complement to government agencies and private business.
Once NGOs had received even lukewarm endorsement by the Congress establishment, it was perhaps inevitable that a major split within the larger voluntary sector should occur. is is not to imply that con icts were not already rife. But whereas previously the divisions were between various Gandhian sects, particularly between those that had grown close to the state and those that had remained relatively aloof, and between Gandhian and non-Gandhian organizations, the kind of overarching master cleavage alluded to earlier, between the political and non-political, had yet to assume its later, epic proportions. Ironically, it was not just from the right for this is what Mrs Gandhi had come to represent but from the le as well that the NGOs would be hit.
THE BACKLASH AGAINST NGOS
As the 1980s progressed, complaints about the NGO sector began to accumulate, the voices of dissent coming increasingly from within the broadly de ned eld of civic activism. NGOs were seen to have lost their radical edge. When exactly the rot set in, what the nature of the ills were, and why it all went wrong varies according to which critics one reads. 4 But a common theme is that the NGO eld ossi ed. Existing organizations became bureaucratized, either directly subverted by establishment interests or undermined by the loss of vigour among activists grown older and more risk-averse. In addition, both new and existing organizations became magnets for youthful new arrivals, for whom activism was, in the words of their critics, just a career path. Slowly but surely, according to this widely repeated view, NGOs were stripped of their ability to mobilize people to take political stands on controversial issues.
ere is undoubted truth in this general plot line, and its basic ingredients do not vary hugely from the narratives of organizational decline recounted by 1960s radicals in Europe or North America. Organizations such as the Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Development (AVARD), and the myriad groups of which it is composed, are sometimes cited in this connection. In later versions of this story, so too are organizations such as the Social Work and Research Centre (SWRC) in Tilonia, Rajasthan. Ironically, it was the SWRC's Bunker Roy who was among those who had sought in the mid-1980s to do something about the declining reputation of the NGO eld, which had su ered from the entry of less altruistic operators (Roy 1988) . For his pains, Roy was rewarded with the charge of cosying up to powerful political patrons and seeking to control the NGO sector (Tandon 1986) .
Arguably, what caused the dispersed grumbling about the role of NGOs to solidify into a lasting critique, which continues to resonate with many people a quarter century later, was a 1984 broadside issued by Prakash Karat of the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M). Karat's article, ' Action Groups/Voluntary Organizations: A Factor in Imperialist Strategy' , was published in the CPI-M journal e Marxist, and subsequently appeared in book form (Karat 1988 ). Karat claimed the existence of 'a sophisticated and comprehensive strategy worked out in imperialist quarters to harness the forces of voluntary agencies/ action groups to their strategic design to penetrate Indian society and in uence its course of development' .
e 'le forces' were advised 'to take serious note of this arm of imperialist penetration' . is would require, among other things, 'an ideological o ensive to rebut the philosophy propagated by these groups' , not least because 'it tends to a ract pe y bourgeois youth imbued with idealism' (Karat 1988: 2-3) .
Since Karat's seminal contribution is o en cited, although without much a ention to its detailed content, it is worth noting a few salient features of his analysis. First, while Karat's focus was on the foreign funding of NGOs, his sights were just as rmly trained on those whose ideological support for the voluntary sector lent it what he considered spurious legitimacy. Second, because he stressed this ideological dimension, Karat's targets were not just development agencies, but academics as well, and because academics were represented as an intrinsic component of 'imperialism', a notion he invested with a de nite agency of its own, Karat condemned not just foreign scholars, but by extension certain Indian academics too. ird, unlike subsequent critics of the NGO phenomenon, Karat did not distinguish much between di erent types of NGOs, except insofar as their sources of funding were concerned. In fact, his distaste for the entire 'social action' phenomenon, which he blamed for what he saw as widespread political inaction, was never far from the surface. In Karat's black-and-white world, 'the whole voluntary agencies/action groups network is maintained and nurtured' by external funds (ibid.: 34).
Upon closer examination, it is clear that Karat's eagerness to a ribute the rise of the NGO sector to imperialist forces stems mainly from political selfinterest: Karat's narrative of foreign subversion (the mirror image of Mrs Gandhi's 'foreign hand') casts both Karat himself and the Le in general as victims. International funding agencies were using NGOs 'as a vehicle to counter and disrupt the potential of the Le movement' (ibid.: 2), which apparently the imperialists recognized as the staunchest protectors of India's sovereignty. In other words, the main target of this ideological manifestation of imperialist aggression was none other than Karat's own CPI-M.
e excesses of Karat's theory not the legitimate concern that foreign funding may undermine the responsiveness of grassroots organizations to local articulations of need served to absolve the Le parties of their manifest failure to mobilize the great mass of marginalized Indians into a sustained political force in most parts of the country. Karat was arguing, in e ect, that Kothari and others had it wrong: people were not turning to non-party formations because India's party system o ered them no meaningful choice. e problem, as India's industrialists would claim a decade later when faced with foreign competition, was the lack of a level playing eld. e NGO sector, which was poaching on the Communists' political turf, had access to cheap sources of nance whereas Le parties did not. Karat's proposal was to strengthen the FC such that '[a]ll voluntary organizations which claim to organise people for whatever form of political activity should be included in the list of organisations (just as political parties) which are prohibited from receiving foreign funds'(ibid.: 64).
e self-serving nature of Karat's plea has not prevented it from becoming the prevailing discourse among social activists since the late 1980s. Karat's dictum that 'those organisations receiving foreign funds are automatically suspect' and 'must be screened to clear their bona des'(ibid.) was incorporated not only into the o cial state oversight process (the Home Ministry's implementation of the amended FC ), it also increasingly manifested itself in the informal ideological litmus-test applied by social activists themselves. In such a context, it is not surprising that civic groups would take elaborate measures to avoid direct contact with foreign funders, giving rise to an intermediary resource-channelling sub-sector, which in a self-ful lling prophecy would come to be widely seen as synonymous with the entire NGO sector. is marks the origin of the contemporary meaning of NGO, both in Sen's valueneutral de nition, which stresses the 'channeling of funding' to grassroots and community groups, and in its pejorative sense the NGO label deployed as a term of abuse by one civic group against another.
Karat's call to mount 'a sustained ideological campaign against the eclectic and pseudo-radical postures of action groups'(ibid.: 65) was taken up with gusto, resolving itself along the now-familiar movement-NGO dichotomy. us, movements worked at the grassroots, while NGOs were o cebased. Movements were radical, NGOs reformist. Movements sought people's empowerment; NGOs made the poor dependent on charity. 5 Movements were political, NGOs depoliticizing.
In an article published in 2002, environmental activist Dunu Roy, too, cites 1984 as a watershed in the evolution of India's environmental movement, reminding his readers that it was in that year that Karat published his in uential tract. Roy recalls that environmental NGOs were among those criticized by Karat and other Le -party-a liated intellectuals. eir crime, as Roy summarized the charges levelled against him and his colleagues, was 'being part of an imperialist design of pi ing environmental concerns against working class interests' (Roy 2002) . Roy argues that this provoked 'a schism between political and apolitical environmentalists' . Here, the divide was not between those a liated with parties and those in the 'non-party' arena, but between 'action groups' that challenged the state's orthodoxy and 'NGOs' incapable of transcending the conceptual boundaries of the existing paradigm. is pa ern of activist one-upmanship has persisted, the use of the NGO sobriquet serving as a marker of the critic's distinctive political position.
e NGOs' critics o en plead that they are voices in the wilderness, waging a lonely struggle against an orthodoxy that lauds the bene cial e ects of NGOs. As Sangeeta Kamat puts it in her book, Development Hegemony: NGOs and the State in India, 'what is clear is that the supporters of voluntary organizations far outstrip their detractors and critics' (Kamat 2002: 21) . Convinced that NGOs remain an object of popular and o cial veneration, despite more than twenty years of constant vili cation at the hands of the state and of other non-party groups, a wide range of observers continue to fulminate against a position that no one or at least no one worth arguing with really propounds. Even Chandhoke, one of the most levelheaded analysts in this crowded eld, whose book on civil society is lled with lucid observations, warns of trouble ahead 'if we begin to think that civil society is mainly inhabited and represented by non-governmental organizations [NGOs] , or indeed that NGOs are synonymous with civil society '(2003: 70-1) . It is not clear who does think in these terms, but we are assured that 'it is this very notion that forms the stu of current orthodoxy' (ibid.: 71). Perhaps in the 1970s or early 1980s such warnings o ered a useful corrective to lazy civic utopianism. But by the early 1990s, and certainly by the twentyrst century, when Kamat's and Chandhoke's books were published, the orthodoxy had moved very much in the opposite direction.
Kamat's catch phrase, 'the NGO-ization of politics', which casts NGOs as agents of depoliticization, captures the current conventional wisdom that NGOs are the non-political face of civil society, and that their expansion threatens to depoliticize the movement sector. e movementversus-NGO duality, cast in explicitly zero-sum terms, is now a mainstay of the international development discourse (Petras and Veltmeyer 2001) . One of the objectives of the World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework of the late 1990s a key element in what has become the Aid E ectiveness Agenda 6 was to funnel less aid through NGOs, and to focus on building viable state institutions rather than bypassing those that do not work. Misgivings about the NGO sector in the international development community were a major feature of the literature even in the early 1990s (Hulme and Edwards 1995; Smillie 1995) .
By 2000, what one British magazine called the 'Backlash Against NGOs' (Bond 2000) was already an established talking point among Western publics. NGOs operating transnationally had become a particular target of criticism. 7 Described as 'interest groups accountable only to themselves', NGOs have been confronted with the question: are 'the champions of the oppressed … in danger of mirroring the sins of the oppressor?' (Bond 2000) STRUGGLE POLITICS, CONSTRUCTIVE WORK, AND THE WRONG KIND OF RIGHTS Kamat has, however, articulated the NGO-movement dichotomy slightly di erently as a contrast between groups pursuing 'struggle-based politics' and those engaged in 'constructive development' . In uenced by post-modernism, Kamat portrayed the la er group as having bought into the modernist myth of progress, while stumbling headlong into liberalism's political trap of expecting constructive work amidst the poor to give way over time to more radicalized forms of mobilization. is critique is consistent with a long radical tradition which sees running health clinics, schools, livelihood programmes, and so forth as politically disempowering. Mumbai Resistance, a group formed to protest the hijacking by 'NGO celebrities' of the 2004 World Social Forum held in Mumbai, argued that by working to ameliorate su ering, 'NGOs come to the rescue' of the state declaring it, in e ect, 'absolved of all responsibilities' . 8 Moreover, 'the NGOs give employment … to certain local persons' who 'might be vocal and restive persons, potential opponents of the authorities' . 9 Chandhoke agrees that NGOs undermine radical movements by drawing away from the path of militant resistance that segment of the non-conformist youth that might have been expected to embrace it. And by 'bailing out' government agencies through service-delivery work, NGOs have 'rescued and perhaps legitimized the nonperforming state … [and] neutralized political dissent …' (Chandhoke 2003: 76 ).
Kamat's stark struggle-politics-versusconstructive-development dichotomy has two shortcomings. First, it violates one of the key methodological tenets of the post-structuralist school in which she roots her analysis: she frames her analysis in terms of a strict binary opposition, thus commi ing the mortal sins of 'reifying' social relations and 'essentializing' political identities. Second, Kamat gives short shri to the tradition in India of combining radical social action with hands-on development. As Mahajan reminds us:
Gandhiji's rst 'satyagraha' in support of the indigo labourers in Chamaparan, while primarily a political struggle, also had elements of voluntary action or 'constructive work' (as Gandhiji called voluntary action), such as training villagers in hygiene, educating children, building roads and digging wells. A er this, Gandhiji made constructive work an integral part of his political strategy, where periods of intense struggle for Independence were interspersed with long periods of voluntary action for the alleviation of su ering and social and economic upli ment of the poor. (Mahajan 1997) Not only do many organizations engage in both struggle-oriented and constructive work, the tendency to see development activities as inherently statusquoist ignores the fact that groups o en engage in constructive work precisely in order to challenge the hegemonic 'truths' propagated by o cial state ideologies. For instance, for some years beginning in the 1990s, the Rajasthan-based Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) operated a small number of 'fair price' (or 'ration') shops, which sell subsidized commodities such as food grains and kerosene. Launching any kind of business initiative was a source of much debate within the MKSS. Some saw it as a costly diversion of scarce energies; others perceived a risk that the group's opponents would portray the MKSS as commi ed to pro ting from, rather than ghting for, the rural poor. e main motivation for running the ration shops was to counter the neoliberal orthodoxy that food subsidy bureaucracies in India's case the Public Distribution System (PDS) inevitably produce unacceptable levels of corruption, including diversion of food grains to the non-needy.
e idea that the PDS was inherently pernicious, that no amount of reform could improve poor people's access to food, was considered a dangerous myth, propagated chie y by the World Bank. By operating shops in a transparent fashion, the MKSS 22). However, almost no evidence is provided to support this claim. Indeed, even foreign-funded NGOs have lent their support to campaigns to curb abuses perpetrated by Western multinationals operating in India and other developing countries. 12 e no-win situation faced by NGOs is also apparent when they seek to link rights claims to issues of identity. One line of a ack claims that '[t]he foreign-funded NGO sector has, with remarkable uniformity, propagated certain political concepts' , most notably 'the primacy of "identity" gender, ethnicity, caste, nationality over class' . 13 Another, however, argues the opposite that their disembedded approaches to rights 'ensure that NGOs will ignore issues of … caste, gender, and environmental justice in their own work' (Kamat 1996) . Worst of all, the rights-based work of 'movements' is undermined by '"advocacy NGOs", which … redirect struggles of the people for basic change from the path of confrontation to that of negotiation, preserving the existing political frame' . e problem, put baldly, is that 'NGOs bureaucratise people's movements' . 14 ough desperately seeking to shed their mainstream essence, NGOs appear doomed to remain intellectually and politically out of their depth.
BLURRING BOUNDARIES AND BRIDGING DIFFERENCES
Despite the persistence of con icts (and the habit of binary thinking) among activists, some of the old barriers are eroding. Chandhoke argues that 'when they have tied up with oppositional social movements', occasionally 'NGOs have been able to transform political agendas ' (2003: 71) . e struggle against the Narmada Dam was, for a time, an example of this kind of coming together. Wagle notes that ARCHVahini, a Gujarat-based 'voluntary agency … active in the areas of rural health and development', was said to have 'played an important part in the initial period of the struggle' (Wagle 1997: 437, and 457) . When ARCH-Vahini and other groups began to question the strategy of the leadersip of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) however, they were dismissed as insu ciently aware of popular feeling in the area, embodying an 'NGO mindset' (ibid.: 438).
hoped to demonstrate that it was possible to treat customers fairly and provide a livelihood for the shop's proprietors without resorting to corruption ( Jenkins and Goetz 2004) .
Clearly, NGOs are in a no-win position when it comes to carving out a more political role. As we have seen, for Mrs Gandhi and the Le parties, NGOs were destabilizing the state; whereas for non-partisan intellectuals whether liberal or post-modern they were propping it up. While NGOs have long been branded apolitical, adopting a more confrontational posture has done li le to enhance their status among movement populists. One critic complained that whereas 'NGOs earlier restricted themselves to "developmental" activities, they have expanded since the 1980s to "activism" or "advocacy" funded political activity' . 10 e fear is that through 'platforms such as the World Social Forum … NGOs are being provided an opportunity to legitimise themselves as a political force and expand their in uence among sections to which they earlier had li le access ' . 11 Where politics is concerned, NGOs are damned if they do and damned if they don't. NGOs that a empt to graduate from a 'welfarist' approach to one based on 'empowerment' are dismissed as dabbling in ma ers for which they are not quali ed (Sen 1999: 333) . Human rights NGOs are a particular sore spot. NGOs 'may even have performed a disservice to the idea of human rights' , argues Chandhoke, 'because rights have not emerged through the struggles of people, but from the baskets of funding agencies ' (2003: 87) . e rights discourse has been articulated by elites through 'layers of mediation … provided by NGOs who are conversant with modes of information gathering' that NGO workers, in other words, have been, moulded into glori ed bureaucrats rather than ghters for the poor (ibid.: 88).
Even when seeking to organize people to demand rights, as opposed to sounding o about rights in international meetings, NGOs are frequently dismissed as driven by a neoliberal project to create individual economic actors rather than politically mobilized collectivities. Kamat claims that when NGOs pursue a rights agenda, 'their concern is o en limited to oppression caused by feudal social relations, and does not refer to capitalist social relations' (ibid.:
India's hosting of the 2004 World Social Forum (WSF) in Mumbai, for example, revealed a more constructive relationship among di erent sectors of civil society. Much of the early planning phases suggested that WSF 2004 would provide an occasion for another round of internecine warfare among the various NGO factions, between NGOs and movement groups, among party-a liated groups, and between party and non-party organizations. 15 ere were also groups that chose not to participate, organizing an alternative event under the banner of 'Mumbai Resistance' . Still, WSF 2004 generated considerable common ground, according to Raina, even amidst 'the divisive world of Indian social movements and NGOs' (Raina 2004:12) . 16 e movement-like activities of social activist Anna Hazare in Maharashtra are di cult to disentangle from the Hind Swaraj Trust, an NGO that he also helps to run ( Jenkins 2004) . In Mumbai, the Rationing Kruti Samiti, a formidable movement for accountability in the PDS during the 1990s, was closely interwoven with the activities of an NGO called Apnalaya, but remained organizationally separate. In the northern districts of Karnataka, a similar division of labour characterized the relationship between the India Development Service, which pursues fairly conventional NGO activities, and the Samaj Parivarthan Samudhay, which assumed a militant campaigning role against government and corporate abuses.
Another well-known example is the Shramajeevi Sanghatana, an activist group that spawned an NGOfront organization, the Vidhayak Sansad. ese two groups provided the empirical material for Kamat's analysis of 'NGO-ization' . ough she anonymizes the organizations in her text, it is evident that these are the groups discussed. 19 In Kamat's account, it was the establishment of the Vidhayak Sansad that deradicalized the Shramajeevi Sanghatana. She frames her story as a cautionary tale of inadvertent NGO contagion. It was the Sanghatana's engagement with the central government agency created to assist and regulate NGOs, Council for Advancement of People's Action and Rural Technology (CAPART) that brought about the movement's tragic demise. To continue working with CAPART, the Sanghatana had to oat a conventional NGO Vidhayak Sansad to oversee the health, education, and livelihood programmes essential for rehabilitating people freed from bonded labour, the Sanghatan's main eld of work. Ultimately, the Sanghatana allegedly began to internalize the norms associated with the NGO's mainstream conception of progress. is manifested itself as what Kamat considered shockingly liberal notions, such as the rule of law and the promotion of science and technology as means of improving people's living conditions.
Kamat cites the case of the Bhoomi Sena (Land Army), 'one of the earliest militant tribal organizations in Maharashtra', as another example of the negative e ects wrought by the dual-purpose organizing strategy. A Bhoomi Sena stalwart recounted to Kamat the story of one Sena organizer who thought he could take the [foreign donor] money for the activists, and he oated a rural development agency, and told activists you can work for Bhoomi Sena but you can be part of this agency and it will help you take care of your family, so you can dedicate yourself to Bhoomi Sena. Many of our activists became more involved with that work, and this broke the Bhoomi Sena … (Kamat 2002: 24) Kamat portrays this case as paradigmatic of how movements get 'hijacked', a term drawn from Rajni Kothari, one of India's most well-known political scientists, whose disillusionment with 'non-party political formations' could be seen in his writings of the late 1980s and early 1990s (1989: 235-50; 1993: 119-39) . Chandhoke also uses the term 'hijacked' on a number of occasions (2003: 24, 82) . And yet, it is worth asking whether the Bhoomi Sena leader's account of that organization's decline might not be self-serving. e narrative bears a striking resemblance to Prakash Karat's analysis of the forces arrayed against the Le parties. In both cases, NGOs were seized upon as useful scapegoats. e Bhoomi Sena's failure to sustain itself as an e ective movement, to build a more durable cadre in support of the cause, can be blamed on well-meaning but misguided activists who failed to recognize the danger of NGO contagion. e movement's leadership itself can be le blameless.
e existence of dual-purpose vehicles is just one manifestation of a gradual blurring of the lines between the movement and NGO categories, which have long stood in mute opposition to one another at the conceptual level, while carrying on a voluble conversation in practice. In any case, the NGOmovement divide always re ected rhetorical positioning more than substantive di erences. e trend since the mid-1990s has been towards the creation of hybrid organizational forms, in which the tactics and structural features of both movement-style groups and NGOs have been incorporated pragmatically.
e Bharat Gyan Vigyan Samithi (BGVS), founded in late 1989 to promote literacy, is a good example of organizational cross-breeding. 20 It is a classic NGO in many respects, undertaking programmes, channelling funds to CBOs, and focusing on conventional good works. at, however, is just part of the organization's identity. Formed in association with a government initiative the Total Literacy Mission the BGVS nevertheless sees itself, with some justi cation, as a 'broad democratic movement' one 'in which even the state participates' .
e BGVS particularly aims to encourage women's 'participation in a process of social mobilization' . 21 Although engaged in constructive development work, the BGVS clearly sees itself as part of struggleoriented politics. Its approach has stressed the need to 'link literacy with many basic livelihood problems and even with questions of exploitation, oppression, and discrimination against women' . e organization describes itself as a 'movement', and its activities as 'campaigns' for instance, the Total Literacy Campaign.
In a reversal of the logic underlying the Shramajeevi Sanghatana and Bhoomi Sena examples, where movements gave birth to NGOs allegedly with disastrous results the BGVS has worked in the opposite direction. It is an NGO that sees itself as capable of spawning movements. Movements thus created can, in turn, catalyse the formation of additional NGOs. By tapping into local women's movements of various kinds such as the anti-liquor campaigns in Andhra Pradesh in the 1990s BGVS programmes have, in the words of the BGVS's own documentation, assisted 'the conversion of the literacy movement into a women's employment generation programme' . Nor does the BGVS appear to recognize boundaries between mobilizational and electoral politics, with some local groups working 'to enhance women's participation in panchayats and the use of the panchayati raj structures to e ect changes to further bene t women' . e BGVS is perhaps best viewed as a civic group a empting to harness the comparative advantage of di erent organizational forms and mobilizational tactics. Indeed, the group's use of the term 'movement' is be er understood if we see it as 'mobilizing people in large numbers and building up a momentum for change' . In its 'Samata campaign', the BGVS's 'aim was to consciously develop and transform the literacy campaign into a cultural and economic movement for women' . e guiding principle behind new initiatives was retaining the 'basic people's movement character of the campaigns' .
ENGAGING WITH PARTIES AND ELECTORAL POLITICS
e blurring of the boundaries between NGOs and movement groups, and, as we have seen, between NGOs and the state, is just one of many factors that have allowed NGOs to enter, gradually and o en indirectly, into the domain of electoral politics.
anks to India's constitutionally mandated system of democratic decentralization which created new tiers of elected local government, including one for every village there is now an almost 'natural' point of entry for NGOs into a sphere once reserved for political parties. And because electoral contestation now takes place regularly unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, when elections were sometimes held at the whim of ruling parties at the state and local levels parties themselves have a much greater incentive to court NGOs, particularly those with strong grassroots networks.
A good example of an indirect means through which NGOs impinge upon electoral politics is to be found in Krishna's study of what he calls 'naya netas' (new politicians) (Krishna 2002 ) members of nonelite castes who have emerged as important 'political xers' . 22 Krishna found that people increasingly turn to naya netas, rather than established gures from dominant landowning castes, to assist in brokering transactions with o cials at the block or district headquarters. However, naya netas have also been instrumental as 'political entrepreneurs' who, on behalf of a village or hamlet, negotiate with party leaders at election time for the price to be paid for the locality's votes. is works best in places that have high stocks of social capital for naya netas to 'activate', in the form of en bloc voting.
Interestingly, in some cases it is through NGO-led projects that naya netas obtain the skills and contacts necessary to ply both their retail trade (assisting people with their work at government o ces) and their wholesale trade (bargaining with parties in exchange for local support). NGOs draw on many more local people for their operations than is re ected in the data on the number they formally employ. For many rural development NGOs, just to take one category, outreach to remote locations (where dialects may be spoken) requires a large number of eld operatives who are not employees, but are paid on a casual basis as and when projects arise. e biggest NGOs involve thousands of young people as outreach workers, survey enumerators, health education assistants, and so forth. is exposes them to the world of o cialdom and o en involves training in technical skills, such as the management of minor irrigation works. e NGO-implemented government programmes are a training ground for naya netas, o en bringing them into contact with party leaders. It is not surprising to nd that among the NGOs that have become increasingly close to political parties as a result of the new incentives thrown up by democratic decentralization are those that have e ectively straddled the NGO-movement divide. One example is the Kerala Sastra Sahithya Parishad (KSSP). While many of its leading lights have enjoyed a long association with the CPI-M, the KSSP has also managed to maintain a reputation for defending its organizational autonomy. is independent streak was demonstrated most visibly in the late 1970s during the campaign spearheaded by the KSSP against the planned Silent Valley power plant, a project backed by the state's CPI-M-led coalition government.
When, in the 1990s, another CPI-M-led government in Kerala initiated India's most farreaching democratic decentralization programme, the KSSP was closely involved in designing the mechanisms through which popular participation could be engendered, all the way down to the neighbourhood level. It also played a major role in the massive training programmes aimed at assisting local communities in formulating comprehensive development plans. 23 In the decade prior to the launching of the new decentralization initiative in 1996, much discussion within the CPI-M had centred on the loss of enthusiasm among local cadres. By using decentralization as a means to re-establish links with the KSSP, the CPI-M hoped not only to bene t from the expertise of the KSSP, but also to rekindle interest among people disillusioned by the ceaseless factionalization of the state CPI-M, which seemed to some like a carbon copy of the Congress. 24 Kerala's CPI-M embraced the movement mode of political organizing, naming its radical decentralization initiative ' e People's Plan Campaign' .
Another organization that at one time edged close to party politics was Ekta Parishad (EP), or 'United Forum' a group based mainly in Madhya Pradesh.
e EP, like the BGVS, de es classi cation. It calls itself 'a mass movement based on Gandhian principles' , but is in essence a coalition of NGOs whose common agenda is to place livelihood resources in the hands of ordinary people. It 'pa erns itself a er a trade union' though the workers involved are in the informal sector: agricultural labourers, small-scale peasant proprietors, forest dwellers, and so forth. It calls itself a 'non-party political entity' , speci cally citing Rajni Kothari, though it distances itself less from party activity than other such organizations, stating openly that it 'has at di erent times provided backing to candidates who support the land issue and pro-poor policies' . e EP's literature even recounts the familiar explanation for its existence: 'there is a vacuum le by political parties and people are looking for other channels for representation ' . 25 Its leader wants to broaden the 'public space' within which people can demand rights. Party competition is seen as constraining that space, because party discipline requires adherence to a full party programme, limiting the range of independent positions that party members may take.
e EP 'mobilizes people … on the issue of proper and just utilization of livelihood resources' . It pursues morchas (which it translates as 'campaigns') and more sporadic activities, such as padyatras (long-distance protest marches) and rallies. Its focus has been on pressuring the state government to implement laws that prevent the alienation of tribal land. e EP counts among its successes the creation of a state-wide task force on land alienation and restitution, the distribution of over 150,000 plots of land, and having pressured the state to withdraw spurious criminal cases against tribal people. It claims a membership of 150,000 dues-paying members, but says its wider following constitutes a 'formation' of more than 500,000.
e EP sees struggle (sangharsh) as peacefully coexisting alongside 'the promotion of constructive work' . It has assisted organizations to establish 'grain banks' designed to help adivasis (tribals) to evade the grasp of moneylenders. is kind of constructive work, because it a acks feudal relations rather than capitalist modes of production, would likely not qualify under Kamat's demanding de nition of what constitutes radical political engagement.
e EP has nevertheless found itself further enmeshed within the electoral sphere. During the decade (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) in which Congress Chief Minister Digvijay Singh was in power in Madhya Pradesh, EP became associated with the Congress, and with Singh in particular. Singh was also said to have drawn on the local popularity of NGO workers a liated with the EP, assisting them to win seats on village councils in exchange for their support for Congress candidates.
Like many other movement groups and NGOs, EP activists were not above bolstering their claims of in uence by recounting the interest taken in their work by some political gure or other, or in ating their claims to legitimacy by referring to the group's strength in a given locality or among a particular constituency. 'Ekta Parishad is a force to be reckoned with' in the Chambal region according to Ekta Parishad anyway 'so much so that during the general elections … Chief Minister himself comes down to Mahatma Gandhi Sewa Ashram at Joura to negotiate and canvas support with Ekta Parishad members' (Ramagundam 2001: 29) . e EP's strategy of hitching its fortunes to Digvijay Singh's Congress Party was considered a mistake by many of MP's activists. By siding openly with Congress during the 2003 assembly elections and appearing on public platforms with the Chief Minister, the EP sacri ced much of its credibility among activists, and earned the hostility of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which ousted Singh from power. 26 Movements have wrestled, individually and in federations such as the National Alliance of People's Movements, with the question of how best to approach the electoral sphere. Should they endorse individual candidates? Or should leading members of the organizations concerned extend support to speci c candidates, without invoking the movement's name or membership? e NBA's Medha Patkar has at times taken the la er option. But when Patkar voiced her individual support for a Congress candidate (former state Home Minister R.R. Patil) in the Maharashtra state assembly elections in 2004, it was inevitable that this would be portrayed as NBA backing for the Congress Party as a whole. 27 Whether such support is in exchange for promises of action on the movement's demands is impossible to say, but as Raina has argued, 'the degree of mobilisation under the NBA banner has been di cult to ignore for most of the mainstream parties, and individuals from these parties have covertly and overtly supported the movement from time to time …' . (Raina 2004:15-16) .
e MKSS, which as we have seen is part of a movement-NGO duo, has increasingly entered the electoral arena. A few MKSS workers contested the inaugural panchayat elections in 1995, but with only the half-hearted blessing of the organization. One who was elected was subsequently found to have engaged in corruption, a major embarrassment for an organization dedicated to rooting out fraud. e group's response in the next round of panchayat elections in 2000 was not to back away from electoral politics, but to insist that anyone associated with the MKSS wanting to contest panchayat elections subscribe to a list of principles, including, most notably, a commitment to thoroughly implement the social audit provisions contained within Rajasthan's newly amended local government legislation provisions which the MKSS had been instrumental in having passed. Among the MKSS's winning candidates was a sarpanch who proceeded to both strengthen the MKSS in the area and demonstrate the possibility of implementing development programmes without rampant corruption. In the 2005 panchayat polls, MKSS supported twelve candidates contesting for the post of sarpanch. Only two were elected, but the MKSS had not selected candidates on the basis of their 'capacity to win' . Rather, the overriding criterion was their 'commitment to follow the norms evolved collectively by the MKSS in discussions held over the last year' . e objective was 'to in uence the mainstream political process in the area so that issues of importance to the MKSS became part of the debate' . 28 e ability of NGOs to engage in electoral politics is limited by their legal status as charitable entities. Some NGOs, such as the Lok Shikshan Sansthan, a Chi orgarh-based 'autonomous organization' that promotes adivasi rights, explicitly build into their founding documents' provisions that prohibit members from contesting elections. 29 Whether this is driven by legal requirements or strategic calculations is di cult to know. Other cases are less clear-cut. At least one women's Self Help Group (SHG), established through a rural credit programme in Maharashtra, voiced an intention to use the SHG as a platform for contesting the next panchayat elections. is was despite a resolution taken by the coordinating body for the SHGs that forbade their use for political purposes. How precisely it could prevent leading SHG members from exploiting their prestige to further their political careers remained unclear. 30 Many NGOs, such as the Karnataka-based SEARCH, train some of the hundreds of thousands of people elected to panchayati raj institutions. Because one-third of panchayat seats are reserved for women, some NGOs specialize in training women representatives or women's groups seeking to engage with the participatory structures bene ciary groups, vigilance commi ees established under local government regulations. Not surprisingly, NGOs engaged in providing information, guidance, and support to elected representatives or aspirants for local-government o ce can begin to resemble political parties in certain respects. NGOs that implement watershed development and other such grassroots projects become intimately involved in the workings of village panchayats.
One NGO that has openly declared its ambition to facilitate the entry of its members into elected o ce is the Young India Project (YIP). e YIP has helped organize many unions of agricultural labourers and other marginalized groups in rural Andhra Pradesh.
e membership of these unions, which coordinate their activities with the YIP, was reported in 2000 as 173,000. e unions work to obtain bene ts from anti-poverty schemes, and to insist on the distribution of surplus lands. e unions also support the election of their own members to panchayati raj institutions, with the support of YIP. In the 1995 panchayati raj elections in the state, members of these unions were said to have contested approximately 7000 village panchayat seats, allegedly winning 6100 (Medira a and Smith 2001; Suvarchala 1999; Bedi 1999) .
India is not the only country where democratic decentralization has provided an opportunity for NGOs and movement groups to enter into the electoral domain. As in India, this has been especially evident among groups that straddle the NGO-movement divide. Clarke tells us that Chilean NGOs 'played an important role in helping Popular Economic Organisations (Organizaciones Econimicas Populares) and Self-Help Organisations (Organizaciones de Auto-Ayuda) to contest the 1992 local elections and to subsequently participate in local government structures' . NGOs in the Philippines 'sit alongside political parties in local government structures created under the 1991 Local Government Code and have actively participated in election campaigns, including the 1992 Presidential and the 1995 local and Congressional elections '(Clarke 1996) .
CONCLUSION
Clarke's review of the relationship between NGOs and politics in the developing world observes that the NGO sector is o en a political microcosm, re ecting larger ideological struggles. e eld of 'NGO action ... in parts of Asia and Latin America, and to a lesser extent in Africa,' he argues, is 'an arena within which ba les from society at large are internalised' (ibid.). India's experience exempli es this trend. e organizational forms assumed by India's civic groups are far too varied and complex to be reduced to simple dichotomies, and yet the competition for legitimacy, and the profound desire of activists to demonstrate their closeness to ordinary people, their autonomy from the state, their nancial independence, their ideological purity in short, their distinctiveness has reinforced a fundamental divide between 'political movements' and 'apolitical' (or depoliticizing) NGOs.
is is in one sense a re ection of how crowded the market for social and political entrepreneurs is in India. But it is also a hangover from the myth (as opposed to the more complex reality) of Gandhi's mode of political action an una ainable ideal in which personal sacri ce gives rise to an organic owering of mass collective action. is is what Morris-Jones called the 'saintly idiom' in Indian politics. It provides a constant 'reference point', 'an ideal of disinterested sel essness by contrast with which almost all normal conduct can seem very shabby' (Morris-Jones 1963: 133-54) .
However, could it not be the case that groups which zealously defend their 'movement' credentials their non-NGO status doth protest too much? Could it be that their critical stance towards NGOs reveals their own political insecurities? It is reasonable enough to interrogate NGOs about the nature of their accountability, the biases smuggled into their programmes, the distortionary impact of their role on the larger civil society. All too o en, however, these searching questions are absent when critics turn their a ention to the other half of this alleged dichotomy people's movements, which are regarded as somehow organically accountable. But how true is this in practice? What exactly are the mechanisms of accountability through which social movements are answerable and sanctionable by larger publics? How democratic are people's movements? Movement leaders o en possess social and political clout, which either preceded their participation in the movement, or else resulted from it. eir political contacts, media pro le, or specialist knowledge of law or administration makes them di cult to overrule. Dissidents from within movement groups are in some cases branded as lackeys of NGOs. 31 One hypothesis at least worth considering is that the persistence of the movement-NGO dichotomy as a point of social and organizational di erentiation re ects the desperation of social activists to shore up their legitimacy in the face of profound new challenges. Many activists are acutely aware that not only has the initial wave of 'social action group' dynamism ebbed, but, indeed, that one of the main justi cations for the existence of such a diversi ed social-movement landscape that parties were no longer capable of inducting new social groups into the formal political process was seriously undercut by the electoral successes since the early 1990s of parties based on lower-caste identity.
Other shi s in the political terrain have disrupted established fault-lines as well. In the development discourse, the post-Washington Consensus on economic policy has supplanted the earlier certainties of neoliberal prescription. Once easily adopted positions against neoliberalism must now yield to more di cult judgements on the role of the state. Whether to engage with, or remain aloof from, the domain of parties and electoral politics is among these hard choices. Arguably, activists in India are increasingly in tune with the sentiments expressed by one observer of the Philippines case: 'NGOs cannot simply avoid politics or leave it in the hands of traditional politicians'(Abad 1993). e stakes are too high. e idea of civic groups transforming themselves into party-like organizations is not without precedent in India. A er all, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the most successful of India's dalit-assertion parties, originated as a civil society formation a trade union once dismissed by its critics as an NGO.
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party vice-president claimed in 2003 that though the KSSP had been born as a popular democratic organisation in the Sixties, it had lost its democratic character in the Seventies and had [by the end of the century] degenerated to the level of being yet another of the 70,000-odd non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) … whose main job is to campaign for the development strategy of the G-8 nations (see 'KSSP Draws Flak in DYFI Organ' , e Hindu, 25 November 2003) .
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31. Challenges to NGOs as agents of accountabilityseeking are treated in greater detail in Goetz and Jenkins (2005) .
